



Is U.S. Federal Debt Too Large? 
Pedro Amaral
U.S. federal debt has grown to levels that have not been seen since the aftermath of the Second World War. Many 
economists argue there is plenty to be worried about when it comes to what this implies for the U.S. economy. This 
Economic Commentary explains that recent increases in debt are typical of the growth seen historically in times of 
crisis, but entitlement growth is a different story. Unchecked, it will impair our ability to respond to crises and economic 
downturns in the future.
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The recent surge in federal debt has been assailed as a 
recipe for economic disaster by many people. Critics claim 
that it will saddle future generations of Americans with 
higher taxes. 
However, while appropriation spending has grown no 
more than it typically does in times of economic crisis, 
entitlements have been growing steadily and continuously. 
In fact, entitlements are more to blame for the deﬁ  cit than 
the temporary measures used to combat the recession. If 
entitlements grow as projected, they will seriously impair 
our ability to respond to crises and economic downturns 
in the future. This Commentary argues that when it comes to 
the federal budget, what we have to worry about is growth 
in entitlements.
Why is the deﬁ  cit (and the resulting debt) so large now? 
For one, tax receipts have fallen. Receipts will amount 
to only 15 percent of GDP in 2010, a post-World War II 
low, reﬂ  ecting the severity of this downturn. But more to 
the point, entitlement spending has quadrupled as a frac-
tion of GDP since the early 1960s, and it is projected to 
continue growing. 
This increase has left the government with very little ma-
neuvering room to react to a recession. Just as monetary 
policy choices have been restricted by a zero interest rate 
bound, recent ﬁ  scal policy has been constrained by entitle-
ment spending.
What Is Government Debt?
Before we explore the consequences of the growing federal 
government debt, it is important to understand just what 
“debt” means. When the federal government’s expenditures 
are larger than its revenues, it must borrow funds to ﬁ  nance 
the resulting deﬁ  cit. It does so by issuing debt. While federal 
debt comes in many forms such as treasury bills, bonds, 
notes, and TIPS, at a basic level these are all the same: 
IOUs issued by the government, which promise repayment 
of the principal along with some interest. Every ﬁ  scal year, 
enough new debt must be issued to cover not only the 
primary deﬁ  cit (revenues minus expenditures that year), but 
also maturing debt and interest payments on existing debt. 
There are two forms of government debt. Debt held by the 
public includes all federal debt held by individuals, corpora-
tions, state or local governments, foreign governments, and 
other entities outside the U.S. government including the 
Federal Reserve Banks. The other form of debt is known as 
intragovernmental debt, which is mostly debt in the hands 
of government trusts such as Social Security and Medicare. 
This is money the government owes itself. For our purposes, 
we will deﬁ  ne debt as debt held by the public. 
The U.S. federal debt relative to the economy’s size was at 
its highest during the Second World War, when it shot past 
100 percent of GDP. After the war’s end, federal debt steadi-
ly decreased to around 25 percent by the mid-seventies, only 
to take off again. While there was some reprieve in the late 1990s, the debt rose to 36 percent of GDP in 2007 and is 
projected to hit 63 percent in 2010, according to the Ofﬁ  ce 
of Management and Budget (OMB). While this is largely 
a consequence of the economic downturn and the govern-
ment’s subsequent response, growing entitlement spending 
is also a major culprit. 
The Evolution of Outlay Components
The U.S. economy is slowly emerging from a deep reces-
sion. Economic theory tells us that issuing new debt is a 
useful buffer against large, temporary, adverse shocks, like 
the one we just experienced. The surge in debt has come 
from two different sources. One is related to the economy’s 
position in the business cycle. The other stems from longer-
term movements in entitlements. 
To understand this, it is helpful to split the federal govern-
ment’s outlays into three components--its largest entitle-
ments (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid), net interest 
payments, and the remainder (which, for simplicity, we will 
call appropriations even though it includes some minor 
mandatory spending). The recent, temporary increase in 
appropriations is comparable to others of the past.   How-
ever, as the result of a continuous, long-term growth trend, 
entitlement spending is now at a historic high.
To illustrate this, ﬁ  gure 1 uses data from the OMB to plot 
appropriation and entitlement outlays as a fraction of GDP, 
together with their long-term trends. Both components tend 
to increase during recessions (the NBER recession dates 
are indicated by the shaded bars), and the most recent one 
is no exception. Appropriations are currently 10 percent 
above their trend, which in historical terms is high, but 
no higher, as a share of GDP, than they were in 1965, for 
example. Moreover, they are projected to come back down 
to 10 percent of GDP by 2014, at which time entitlements 
and appropriations will be roughly of equal size, something 
unprecedented. 
Why Does All This Matter?
Many people are asking:  “Is the current debt level too 
high?” To answer this question, we must ﬁ  rst understand 
what “too high” means. Instead of deﬁ  ning a particular 
threshold above which the debt to GDP ratio is deemed too 
large (and about which economists cannot agree), it is more 
helpful to deﬁ  ne a country’s debt as excessive if it adversely 
affects the economy in one or more of the following three 
ways. 
First, it is certainly the case that the economy will suffer if 
new debt cannot be placed at “reasonable” interest rates. 
Take, for example, the recent case of Greece, which saw 
the yield on its 10-year bonds increase from around 4.5 
percent in November of last year to a peak of 10 percent 
in late April this year. Such increases seriously impair a 
government’s ability to ﬁ  nance future expenditures, and 
while some may see this as a disciplining tool, it is hardly 
convenient to have this happen during a severe downturn. 
Moreover, as economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff recently pointed out, such increases in the interest 
rate premium may force the government to tighten ﬁ  scal 
policy for a considerable period of time, increasing taxes to 
generate revenues, but sacriﬁ  cing future growth. 
Secondly, as the public and private sector compete for 
funds, a country’s debt might be deemed too large if it leads 
to increases in the interest rates at which private businesses 
ﬁ  nance themselves, thus crowding out private investment. 
If the government uses the funds for consumption rather 
than investment expenditures, overall national investment is 
reduced, leading, again, to lower future growth.
Finally, one could also say the debt level is too high if 
instead of leading people to expect the government to raise 
taxes in the future, it leads them to expect that the Federal 
Reserve will monetize the debt, causing inﬂ  ation. That is, 
the Federal Reserve would buy and then retire the debt. 
Is it rational to expect such a thing? Well, it might be. Econ-
omists Tom Sargent and Neil Wallace famously pointed out 
a way in which it could happen. First, they said to consider 
situations in which a condition called ﬁ  scal dominance is in 
force. With ﬁ  scal dominance, the ﬁ  scal authority indepen-
dently sets the future budget path, and the monetary author-
ity then has to adjust seigniorage to ﬁ  nance any difference 
between planned future revenues from bond sales and the 
public demand for these bonds. Sargent and Wallace then 
noted that if interest rates on government bonds were larger 
than the growth rate of the economy for a long enough 
period of time, the Federal Reserve might lose control of the 
inﬂ  ation rate. 
Clearly, as far as the U.S. is concerned, this condition on 
interest rates is at odds with empirical evidence, and the 
Federal Reserve’s record is one of independence. However, 
even if such expectations are not rational, they can become 
Figure 1. Outlays as a Share of GDP
Notes: Long-term trends (dashed lines) were obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott 
fi  lter. Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Offi  ce of Management and Budget.













(Dashed lines are long-term trends.)
Share of GDPself-fulﬁ  lling. This is particularly true in the current context, 
where the amount of excess reserves is so large that banks 
can easily accommodate any extra demand for deposits com-
ing from households that believe prices will rise. 
Are any of these three mechanisms at work in the U.S. 
economy?  The short answer is “not yet.” The U.S. govern-
ment has been able to place further debt at interest rates 
below pre-crisis levels, and government bond yields are 
low by historical standards. Moreover, at the height of the 
crisis these yields were even lower, meaning investors judge 
U.S. debt to be one of the safest assets available in rough 
economic times. However, as the economy recovers and the 
Fed eventually releases its strong grip on short-term rates, 
interest rates will rise. When this happens, in addition to the 
entitlement problem, the government could face a debt-
servicing problem reminiscent of the late 1980s, when econ-
omists were concerned with exploding interest payments. As 
can be seen in ﬁ  gure 1, net interest outlays are projected to 
double by 2015.
Second, there is no evidence that crowding-out is currently 
a problem. Corporate borrowing rates remain low, and 
there has been a recent surge in corporate bond issuance. 
Although private investment has decreased considerably in 
the recent recession, most economists would argue that this 
was mainly due to liquidity and information asymmetry 
problems, not because interest rates were unusually high. 
The inevitable increase in interest rates will also increase the 
possibility of crowding-out. Everything else equal, the closer 
the economy is to full employment and the fewer resources 
that are idle, the more severe the crowding-out. Coming out 
of a deep recession, it is less likely that this effect is signiﬁ  -
cant, but only as the economy recovers will we be able to 
ascertain its full extent.
Finally, regarding inﬂ  ation expectations, they have, so far, re-
mained well-anchored at historically low levels, as Tim Bianco 
and Joe Haubrich argue in a recent Economic Commentary (2010).
What about the origin of all the funds the U.S. government 
has been borrowing? One issue that has received some at-
tention is foreign holdings of U.S. public debt. The fraction 
held by foreign entities ballooned from 5 percent in 1970 to 
roughly half today. There are at least two proximate causes 
for this change. One is that, as an asset, the U.S. public debt 
is attractive abroad. The other is that the U.S. private sec-
tor’s savings rate has decreased substantially in the afore-
mentioned period. 
The real issue here is not that foreign borrowing, either by 
the government or the private sector, is inherently bad. The 
problem is that it is ﬁ  nancing current consumption rather 
than investment. This is, of course, troubling for future 
Americans who will eventually have to pay for this (and 
even then it is a problem only if future growth is not suf-
ﬁ  ciently high), but it is far from implying any loss in sover-
eignty as some argue.         
The Outlook on the Debt
While the debt level may not yet be excessive, there are 
some indications that more sobering times might be ahead. 
The key issue is keeping the primary deﬁ  cit, and entitle-
ment spending in particular, in check. The Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO) estimates that entitlement spending 
as a fraction of GDP will jump from 10 percent in 2009 to 
16 percent in 2035 and over 23 percent by 2080 if current 
policies remain unchanged, with Medicare and Medicaid 
accounting for the bulk of the increase. Inevitable increases 
in interest rates and the possibility of crowding out further 
complicate matters. 
But there are reasons to think the worst-case scenario can be 
avoided. The recent passage of health care reform demon-
strates a political awareness about the need to tackle entitle-
ment spending. According to the CBO, the legislation will 
result in a net reduction in the federal deﬁ  cit of $143 billion 
between 2010 and 2019. Two caveats are in order: First, this 
represents accumulated savings of only 0.5 percent of GDP, 
and second, this estimate is predicated on some questionable 
assumptions on the future behavior of the U.S. economy 
and is subject to enormous uncertainty going forward.  
Hopefully, though, this is a harbinger of a broader, and 
much needed, entitlement reform. Moreover, when faced 
with similar situations, the U.S. government has historically 
cut primary deﬁ  cit spending in response to increases in the 
debt to GDP ratio, according to work by Henning Bohn. 
Maybe, in this case, past behavior will turn out to be a good 
indicator of future actions.
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